

Consociational Democracy in Africa

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Abstract

The analysis of favorable factors for establishment and maintenance of consociation democracy in Africa is important to assess the probability of success for consociation model in diverse societies. However, „these“ factors have not been dealt with adequately in the previous studies on Africa. So, my work attempts firstly to discuss on the presence or absence of favorable conditions for consociationalism in Africa, secondly show a comparative analysis of favorable conditions in consociational democratization attempts, hindrances and prospects in Benin, Botswana and Kenya, thirdly contextualization explanations of forces leading to consociationalism either through structural or voluntaristic classification of selected consociational democratic cases, fourthly a review of impediments to and prospects for consociational democratization in Africa generally, and lastly a conclusion with a comparative way forward of the selected cases for consociational democratization in Africa at large.

Keywords: Consociationalism; Democracy; Ethnic

1. Introduction

Consociationalism in democracy is an approach towards managing conflict in divided society democratically; it has a long history as a theory and a political practice, and has consequently evolved significantly over time in Africa in the dimensions of institutional design of power sharing for effective democratization. However they have remained theoretically underexplored in their connections both by supporters and critics of the consociational strategy of conflict management. Those critical of consociationalism as a whole often focus on its power-sharing dimension, while critics of territorial approaches to conflict management in divided societies normally ignore it altogether. In Africa ethnic, conflicts and political violence are not a new phenomenon but the contemporary proliferation of conflicts in multi-ethnic states is such a vital development that requires a careful examination of the undemocratic practices that fail to respect the minorities as compared to consociational democratic practices. The political scientists and constitutional engineers have identified some connections between the political institutions and the proliferation of ethnic mobilization for participatory and

representative democratic leadership. According to author in [1], he advised that constitutional engineers in developing countries are necessary to adopt consociation devices to guarantee the political stability. Subsequently, Authors in [2] added that the consociation lists have recommended that Africa “will need to adopt and maintain consociation governance at federal centre” to “practice democracy. Furthermore Lijphart developed and advocated the consociation theory, and recognized certain favourable factors for consociation governance by ass

1.1 Definition of terms

Consociationalism; is often viewed as synonymous with **power-sharing**, although it is technically only one form of power-sharing [3]

Democracy; is a government where the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections [4]

Ethnic; Are those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both or because of memories of colonisation and migration, this belief must be important in group formation as argued by author in [4]

2. Consociation Democracy in Africa; As a theoretical framework

Consociation theory is an “empirically grounded normative theory that – through promoting power sharing of specific kind promises a democratic solution to societies confronted by durable ethnic division and political conflict”, as quoted from author in [5]. Consociationalism literally means “association between equals”. Despite having distinct cultures, institutions and identities, ethnic groups in consociations evolve a system in which they interact politically equal. They feel autonomous in their respective ethnic groups and have feelings that they are enjoying equal partnership in the system. They are politically organized, and a mechanism for their proportional representation is set-up. Author in [6] adds that; their elites that join together to form the national elite are intensively engaged in the politics of accommodation and bargaining.

Author in [7] theoretically defined consociation democracy in terms of four characteristics: firstly as a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; secondly as the mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule as an additional protection of minority interests; thirdly as Proportionality as the principal standard of political representations, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; And lastly as a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. In addition to same author, he proceeded in [8] arguing that new consociation cases have been identified in Africa making consociation democracy moving away “from its empirical region of origin” of, Western Europe, from countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. As well as Beyond Europe, like in Lebanon, Malaysia, Suriname, Cyprus and India which were categorized as consociations at different times hence its development at the moment is evidenced to day in my selected cases of Benin, Kenya and Botswana as I will expound in my ascending sections of this work.

3. The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy in Africa

The favourable factors for establishment and maintenance of consociation democracy are important to examine the relevancy of consociation democracy with certain cases. Although, these factors are ‘neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociation democracy’, according to author in [9], they can improve the ‘explanatory and predictive power of the consociation model’. While, the consociational model is based on an “empirically grounded normative theory”, the favourable factors are not derived deductively but inductively after a comparative study of various consociational regimes over years.

Hence, with the expansion of consociational universe, in Africa the favourable factors have undergone significant modifications in number and content over time to ensure equal power sharing, participation and general people’s ownership of the government (democratic practice) as discussed in subsequent sub topics.

3.1 No Majority Segment

The first favourable factor for the smoothly functioning of consociational democracy is that there should not be any group having a dominant majority in concerned society. According to consociationalism as a theory, the presence of a majority group is an obstacle in smooth running of consociational governance as evidenced in African democracies with overwhelming majorities. Normally, the majority groups in multi-ethnic societies prefer majoritarian rather power sharing models. According to author in [10], he argues that the evidence showed that consociational experiences in Cypriot in 1963 and Ireland in 1972 remained ineffective due to the presence of substantial majorities, as the case was in Kenya with the kikuyu ethnic group during President Kenyatta’s leadership and kalengjine ethnic group during Daniel Arap Moi regime.

In his conclusion he argued that the Greek Cypriots majority in Cypriot and the protestant majority in Ireland were responsible for the breakdown of consociational arrangements and as it transverse to African countries most evident today on religious front in Egypt Muslim brother hood segment and the westernised non-Muslim jihadist, this has continuously made the majority segments make consociational democracy challenged as well as encourage pluralistic oppressions promoting un democratic practices making conflict inevitable.

It should be noted that segments of roughly equal size are more likely to cooperate during negotiations for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Conversely the uneven size of ethno-linguistic groups in Africa produce hurdles for the existence of consociationalism hence making favourable requirement for consociationalism to be missing. The African societies are unevenly divided among various ethno-linguistic groups, having dominant communities on one hand and a small minority of other. So this factor, also, suggests that the ethno-linguistic composition of Africa is not favourable for effective consociationalism, though successful trials have been made in Botswana in its incongruent bicameralism (Parliament), where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses this has continuously proved to be a check to the majority regulation over the minority in the country.

3.2 Small Number of Segments

It has been argued that the appropriate number of segments in a plural society is important for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. A society that is composed of few segments has greater chances to practice consociational democracy successfully than a society having relatively greater number of segments as it is in Africa. Author in [11] argued that ‘cooperation among groups becomes more difficult as the number of those participating in negotiations increases’.

For the case of Africa, balance of power between executive and legislative, judicial review which allow minorities to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust to them as well as have a chance to enact or prevent legislation through the use of referendums to block legislation, all call for a consociation approach where there is a citizen's initiative as the case is in Botswana where citizens royalty, initiatives and voice is channelled through the blend of western and traditional leaders who serve and represent all sections of the country's ethnic diversity and citizenry in the parliament level.

3.3 Small Population Size

As observed in the original cases of consociational democracy, namely the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria having small population sizes. This evidence led author in [12], to argue that, the mode stand small size of population is a favourable condition for consociational democracy. He argued that ‘small size has both direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy would be established and successful: it directly enhances the spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation, and it indirectly increases the chances of consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of decision making thus rendering the country easier to govern’. Moreover, he maintained that “in small countries like the Gambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Swaziland and Lesotho political leaders are more likely to know each other personally than in larger countries like Nigeria, south Africa, Mali, Algeria and Egypt, the decision making process is less complex, and such countries generally do not conduct a very active foreign policy”, as quoted for author in [13].

And due to the population size, this condition has differently facilitated power sharing process and ensures the successful operation of consociational democracy in Africa differently. To make consociational democracy more applicable in some smaller countries in Africa, it should be noted that in some African parliaments, introduction of chambers representing regional interests, opposition and the other national interests, proportional representation, allows (small) minorities to gain representation too as evidenced in the new legislative structure of the lower senate and upper senate in Kenya with its regional parliaments and national parliaments respectively that both contribute to national policy formation.

3.4 External Threats

It has been argued that external threats to the survival of a state create cohesiveness in most nations in Africa. Consequently, this cohesiveness promotes the prospects for a successful consociational democracy. The evolution and development of consociational democracy in countries like Holland, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland during the First and Second World Wars seemed to suggest that the external threats in these countries strengthened the ties among the subcultures at mass level and the ties between leaders and followers as

the case was for south Africa, its diverse ethnic division with majority of Zulus united against the Dutch supremacy who practiced apartheid, it should be evidenced that all Africans united and supported African National Congress (ANC) up-to date. It should furthermore be noted that two segments are unfavourable for consociationalism, according to author in [14] because it would result into minority-majority split within subcultures despite the existence of these splits for south Africa some National unit of blacks has been evident since 1994.

For the African case, I argued that ‘since the inception of consociational democracy, has been facing the challenge of national security and effective unity’. Traditionally, the threat to African’s security and to some extent unit has been external. However, today, it can be arguably asserted that “the major threat to national security in Nigeria emanates more from internal sources of the Buko Aram rather than it being directly external”. In review of this unfavourable factor towards consociational democracy, a neutral head of state, either a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up their party affiliation, regional and ethnic belonging after their election would create a peaceful democratically consolidated Nigeria with less threats of Muslim jihadist from the north attacking the Christian Ibo and Yoruba in the struggle for representative leadership solutions or consociational democracy efficiency.

3.5 Overarching Loyalties

According to author in [10], he argues that the presence of overarching loyalties is crucial for consociationalism as directly quoted below;

“The divisive and cohesive forces cleavages and overarching loyalties may operate simultaneously, and the conflict potential of cleavages depends on the combined effect of the two forces, and an overarching loyalty may produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular segments”

It has been argued that overarching loyalties are supportive ‘for consociationalism if the divisions among the segments are counterbalanced to some extent by an overarching sense of belonging together’ as quoted from author [13]. Nationalism and religion may prove potentially cohesive forces in contemporary Africa. However it should be noted that African nationalism based on cultural norms and traditional leaderships across Africa proved a unifying force after the partition during colonialism and struggle for independence.

Nonetheless, the spirit of “Ubuntu” is a potential binding force for majority of Africans that can greatly ensure organization and corporatist interest groups, which represent minorities in form of brotherhood and sisterhood as a one family of “we” African people. A rigid constitution, if this spirit of Ubuntu is well implemented then it would prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities as well the people themselves will have the desire to participate in there governance due to the grounded loyalty from that ideology as well as act as a check to their governments for an improved consociational democratic practice in Africa

3.6 Socio-economic Equality

Socio-economic equality among individuals and groups has been considered essential for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. According to author in [15], it is the second major factor for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. It has been argued that relatively deprived segments in a society may assert for “redistribution which constitutes the kind of zero-sum game that is severe challenge for elite cooperation” as quoted from author in [16] hence, the grave disparities among segments may endanger the viability of consociation.

Although, socioeconomic differences within all the segments of African society as evident with the unequal distribution of minerals resources, human and technology development, some poorer segments have been easily distinguished from the richer ones. Greater regional disparities in all the regional economic communities of Africa are no more conducive for the consociational governance in respective states however proportional employment in the public sector and equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister as the only *primus inter pares* with an independent central bank managed by experts and not politicians setting out monetary policies then despite the uneven distribution of the various resources, African state can achieve effective consociation democracy through having equal representation and participation of the majority and minority as well as the varying segments of the population as evidenced in Botswana

3.7 Geographical Concentration of Segments

Geographical concentration of segments is vital for the viability of consociational democracy. It has been argued that “the clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility” [10]. However as evidenced in Uganda with its decentralized system of government and Nigeria’s federal government, where (regional) minorities have considerable independence and some degree of consociationalism is reached, the challenge that remains is how it could be made more effective and provide equal infrastructural development of regions which have been rejected for many decades since independence in form of social economic, health other forms geared to equal regional balanced development in Africa

3.8 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation

Traditions of compromise and accommodation foster consociationalism as argued by author in [17]. It has been asserted that “plural societies may enjoy stable democratic government if the political leaders are engaged in coalescent rather than adversarial decision-making” as quoted from Author in [10].

In a situation where executive power is shared between multi parties, not concentrated in one, having many of these cabinets oversized by including parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority but equal representation of both minority and majority voices as evidence in the success story of Botswana where the chiefs of traditional leadership were integrated in the main stream government decision making process and law formations as well as dissemination of information to the citizens through them.

4. A comparative analysis of favourable conditions in consociational democratisation attempts, hindrances and prospects in Benin, Botswana and Kenya

Experiences vary so widely in Africa that one can only speak of consociational democratisations as being the best approach for democratization in our pluralistic societies. Though most African countries were granted independence under a multiparty system, before long, military rule and one-party states typified African regimes. Some underwent crippling civil wars, from which a few are only beginning to emerge.

After 1989, however, Africa witnessed a sudden resurgence of consociational democracy. My work in this chapter will analyse postcolonial democratic experiences in sub-Saharan Africa, concentrating on three carefully selected comparative analysis of consociational democracy approaches as implemented in Benin, Kenya and then Botswana as a reflection of sub-Saharan Africa consociationalism attempts success and challenges.

4.1. Consociational democracy through the ‘National Conference’ Model, a leading African case of Benin

Benin was not a good democratic prospect’, quoted from author in [17]. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, successive governments experienced failure in ensuring social, economic and political stability in 12 years, which ended in 1972, when military officer Mathieu Kérékou seized power said author in [18]

Nonetheless, its transition to consociational democracy, in particular its ‘national conference’ mechanism, served as a model for a number of other countries in Africa like Togo. Moreover, it is one of the few African countries to have an alternation of sharing power organised by Kérékou its president for the future course, bringing together representatives of all sectors of Beninese society, including ‘teachers, students, the military, government officials, religious authorities, nongovernmental organizations, more than 50 political parties, ex-presidents, labor unions, business interests, farmers, and dozens of local development organizations’. In line with author in [19] that paper on Benin national conference as was edited by author in [20], she argued that this action ratified a new constitution and ensured equal distribution of power in Benin as a consociational democratic state.

Benin can boast on its smooth transition to democracy and a subsequent alternation of presidents provided for and supported by the engineering of the constitutional that was consociational in nature as evidenced after the converging of the national conference however its democratic credentials are somewhat tarnished by electoral irregularities and serious corruption. Ethno regional divisions often threaten the institutionalisation of compromise and the recycling of erstwhile discredited leaders long left voters with few alternatives. Now since the power has peacefully passed to a new generation, Benin may once again prove to be a model for consociational democracy through the National conference in Africa.

4.2. Unenthusiastic consociational democracy transformation of Kenya

Contrary to Benin national conference that forced on all stake holders participation in the consociationalism democratization process of the national conference, in Kenya priority was given to elite appointed to political positions. For almost thirty years, from 1963 until 1991, Kenya was a prototypical one-party state. At independence time the leader Jomo Kenyatta, of Kenya African National Union (KANU), had absorbed the opposition. Nepotism to his own Kikuyu ethnic group, and repeatedly amended constitution to centralise power hence being Authoritarian in nature, his successor, Daniel Arap Moi, assumed power after a bitter internal struggle and replaced influential Kikuyu with members of the Kalenjin (the ethnic group to which he belongs) and some allied ethnic groups. He also further concentrated power in the hands of the presidency, [21]

Throughout the 1980s, a dramatic rise in autocratic rule and high-level corruption, combined with steady economic decline, fed internal discontent, as commented by author in [22] and this provoked civil societies ranging from churches, ethnic uprisings and most prominent among these pressure groups was FORD, the Forum for the Restoration of consociational Democracy, author in [23] in addition to Donor pressure which rapidly grew during this period. In late 1991, donors suspended all new aid to Kenya (except humanitarian assistance) until a number of reforms were adopted, including liberalizing the political arena. Forcing president at the time, Arap Moi to announce that Kenya would return to multipartyism through consociationally amended constitution by parliament by allowing opposition parties to function legally the executive branch remained quite powerful at the time. And in early 1990's, the government agreed to share power through multi-party competition and co-opting transitions which enabled the country to hold three multiparty competitive elections but all in favour of KANU in 1992, 1997 and 2002.

The first two times, President Moi was re-elected and KANU retained control of parliament in a process that fell short of international standards of 'free and fair', in large part due to a host of illegitimate strategies, including a skewed distribution of constituencies, irregularities in voter registries, partisan media and electoral commission, fraudulent vote counts and ethnic cleansing in key areas. The Benin approach has proven to be more consociational and representative of the various segments of its society than the one in Kenya whose elites politicise their mandates evidenced through ethnic and personality-based divisions within the opposition facilitating continuous KANU's victory to date.

It is unlikely that those in power would have allowed themselves to be removed through the ballot box in Kenya. In the 1992 and 1997 elections, donors had sufficient evidence of an uneven playing field and poll irregularities to contest the legitimacy of the outcomes. However, they chose not to, mainly out of concern for stability. In between elections, they virtually ignored issues of democratisation making the consociational attempts to satisfy and co-opt the opposition to reduce loss of public support of the KANU party, as stated by author in [6]. This is a big challenge in that the voices of the minority are rejected and consociationalism democracy happen as a political strategy in support and continuous strengthening of the majority ruling party regime voice in Kenya

4.3 Consociational democratic surprise of Botswana in Africa with its Authoritarian Roots:

In comparison to both Benin and Kenya's approach of consociational democracy, the southern African country of Botswana is often cited as one of the continent's 'premier' democracies. Author in [24] states that it one of the African country whose leaders have shared power and derived legitimacy from a political system that delicately balances modern statecraft born in the West with traditional authoritarian structures that predate the advent of colonialism with the primary architect of independence. Seretse Khama, Botswana's first president set the precedent for managing the diamonds and copper-nickel matte wealth discovered in 1967, [25] , in a transparent and nationally advantageous manner, as was added by author in [25] .

In addition to his approach of blending the western ideologies with traditional authoritarian style of governance gave rise to an appropriate power sharing strategy which had the support of the indigenous of the country in a way that the National Assembly, was made to be comprising of the House of Chiefs, a 15-member advisory body consisting of chiefs from the eight primary ethnic groups in the country, four elected sub-chiefs and three additional representatives chosen by the chiefs and sub-chiefs. This institutional sharing of power (consociation style) and somewhat symbolic recognition of the importance of traditional authority is supplemented at the local level by the oft-cited *kgotla*, or village council, system, sited from author in [26].

In my argument given the degree of success of consociational democratic practice in Botswana, it has proven to be a better consociational attempt with prospects and manageable hindrances than that in Kenya and Benin currently in Africa, however the leading hindrance to effective consociational democratic practice in Botswana is that its 'dominant political party' has remained in power since independence, rendering parties such as the BNF and BCP as a permanent opposition.

Despite the success illustrated above, given the absence of alternations of political leadership, Botswana as Africa's 'premier' traditional consociation democracy has yet to demonstrate its ability to withstand the challenges of genuine political change of party leadership. The contradictory notions of democracy and the bottom-up assertion of popular will, countered by distinctly non-democratic tendencies of top-down traditional authority and single-party control of the government, have coexisted harmoniously since independence, but the potential remains for future leaders with explicit non-consociational democratic agendas to upset this balance to fully out compete all other forms of consociational democratization as discussed for the case of Kenya and Benin.

5. Structural verse the voluntaristic explanations, a classification of consociational democracy studied cases of Botswana, Benin and Kenya review and implementation

Explanations informed by the impact of culture, history and economics are diverse and often result in different conclusions. Early advocates of the modernisation paradigm focused on the inability of 'traditional' societies to adapt to the social, economic and political demands of modernity as explained by the Botswana case that incorporated its traditional systems with the modern state to both operate concurrently addressing its structural impediments to incentives for democracy vis-à-vis voluntaristic explanation that emphasises the ability of select actors to affect change.

Author in [27] argues that, these agents include: rulers employing strategies designed to maintain the status quo or transform of the political system; grassroots civil society organisations mobilised to confront intransigent incumbent regimes, with a perfect evident of the national conference of Benin that brought together representatives of all sectors of Beninese society, including ‘teachers, students, the military, government officials, religious authorities, nongovernmental organizations, more than 50 political parties, ex-presidents, labour unions, business interests, farmers, and dozens of local development organizations the country’s population.

To a smaller extent, furthermore the voluntaristic explanation is evidently implemented by the temporal power sharing measures with a recall between political elites in Kenya during Kibaki’s leadership where Raila Odinga was his opposition but made his prime Minister in the same regime.

6. Impediments to and prospects for consociational Democratisation in Africa

Until the early 1990s, consociation democratisation scholars and experts in African politics expected authoritarianism, one-party states and military rule to continue to dominate the African political landscape, as they had for decades. They were convinced that the continent lacked the structural prerequisites towards consociationalism associated with democracy as evidenced today and discussed below;

- ❖ Africa is not characterised by advanced capitalism, has low literacy rates and has no civic culture to buttress democracy. It is true that impediments to democratisation in Africa are stronger than in any other region. The state and civil society, two critical actors in a democracy, both are currently weak.
- ❖ In addition; African countries generally suffer from longstanding economic crises and extreme poverty, little experience with liberal democratic governance, and widespread societal alienation.
- ❖ Another fundamental obstacle to democratisation throughout the continent is neo-patrimonial rule, described as ‘the *core* feature of politics in Africa’. Bratton’s original experiment of Neo-patrimonialism is inimical to democratisation because the distribution of state resources is based on the ruling elite’s personal ties, rather than on principles such as the public good, national citizenship or equal opportunities. The ruler’s personal prerogatives also eclipse the role of formal institutions and the rule of law by depriving those they share with power to be rendered powerless and less influential in the affairs of the country as assumed to be taken by these several approaches in the three case studies expounded above.
- ❖ Even if a full transition to consociational democracy does take place, the endurance of consociational democracy is an even more difficult challenge. For a number of historical and practical reasons, political identification in Africa tends to be organised along ethno-regional lines and political parties often compete to be able to bring benefits to their client networks. The ethnicization of politics, often reinforced by politicians themselves, promotes competition for access to resources, rather than the institutionalised compromise that theoretically characterises a consociational democracy.

It should there for be noted and understood that the impediments to democratisation are therefore significant, but certainly not insurmountable. Numerous transitions to sharing power democratically in several consociation

styles in Africa is evident and has occurred in Africa since 1989 as expounded in the Kenya, Benin and Botswana comparative analysis. Many non-selected countries of my work may have had different consociational styles or approaches that short-lived or only presented democratic façades, but in a number of cases, democracy has shown surprising endurance and resilience.

Author in [38], argues that, though many countries' trajectories are viewed as disappointing, failures can often lead to more imaginative and responsive systems of governance in order to answer the national question from the learning process of trails geared to reaching democratic consolidation through consociationalism. Despite the paucity of consociational democratic success stories in Africa and the failure of this consociational democracy where successful in improve socio-economic conditions, Author in [29] asserts that liberal consociational democracy remains a widely shared popular aspiration across the continent of Africa to have a an effective government where the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections with transformed public service, social development and cultural protection of African people

7. Conclusion

The identification of favourable factors has improved the predictive power of consociational model to democracy in the African context. I therefore argue that the probability of the successful consociational democracy in a particular society in Africa can be assessed through the analysis of favourable factors in that society.

Following this proposition, my work attempted to examine the relevancy of consociational democracy with the multi-ethnic societies of Africa for the case of Botswana and Kenya and civil society pluralistic makeup for Benin by analysing their respective favourable conditions and derived consociational democratic approach as witnessed in the differing consociational model as discussed in each case above. My evidence reveals that with some exceptions, these factors could be missing in the non- selected African countries due to the different histories, cultures and makeup of each though the favourable factors in my selected cases are quantified for a comparative judgement in the southern, western and eastern regions representation of Africa.

The comparative analysis shows that the Kenya and Benin case is not coupled with a high success as compared to Botswana of the southern region of Africa at the moment. So, the evaluation of favourable factors in my work suggest that consociationalism putting in consideration of the traditional administrative systems with the blend of western systems of government would yield fantastic consociational democracies as a theoretical approach across all African countries with Botswana as the leading model (consociational democracy success) for all others on the continent.

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